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Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa: lessons 
learned and issues arising from West African countries
The current Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak ravaging three 
nations in West Africa has affected more than 14,000 persons 
and killed over 5,000. It is the longest and most widely spread 
Ebola epidemic ever seen. At the time of this overview (Written 
November 2014), having affected eight different nations, 
Nigeria and Senegal were able to control and eliminate the 
virus within a record time. Ghana has successfully, to date, 
kept the virus away from the country, despite economic and 
social relationships with affected nations. What lessons can 
we learn from Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana in the current 
epidemic? How can the world improve the health systems in 
low- and middle-income countries to effectively manage future 
outbreaks? Recently, the Royal College of Physicians launched 
a new partnership with the West African College of Physicians 
to curtail the effects of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in 
the region. We believe that strengthened health systems, skilled 
human resources for health and national ownership of problems 
are key to effective management of outbreaks such as EVD.
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Introduction 
The ongoing Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic that began 
approximately 10 months ago in the Republic of Guinea 
(Guinea-Conakry),1 was declared by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as a ‘public health emergency of 
international concern’ on 8 August 2014. Since 23 March 2014, 
when the WHO was fi rst notifi ed, EVD has affected (as at 14 
November 2014) 14,413 individuals in eight different nations, 
with 5,177 deaths and a case fatality rate (CFR) of 35.92%.2,3
The West African EVD outbreak is different from the 2014 
Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) with 66 cases (38 confi rmed, 28 probable and 49 deaths), 
including 8 among healthcare workers (HCWs), and a higher 
CFR of 74.24%.4
The current Ebola outbreak in West Africa is very unusual, 
and has almost completely reversed developmental gains 
in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone following their civil 
wars.5 According to WHO situation reports, case incidence 
has continued to increase in Sierra Leone, and transmission 
remains intense in Guinea and Liberia, affecting all districts of 
the two countries. The largest number of cases has been seen in 
Liberia (6,878 EVD with 2,812 deaths, 40.88% CFR), followed 
by Sierra Leone (5,586 cases with 1,187 deaths, 21.45% CFR) 
and Guinea (1,919 cases with 1,166 deaths, 60.76% CFR). Other 
affected nations are Nigeria (20 cases with 8 deaths, 40.0% 
CFR), Mali (4 cases with 3 deaths, 75.0% CFR), Senegal and 
Spain (one case each with no death, 0% CFR) and USA (5 cases 
with 2 deaths, 40.0% CFR).2 This shows different levels of 
infection, as well as mortality, across the affected nations.
There have been previous outbreaks of EVD in West Africa. 
In 1976, the fi rst case was identifi ed with two concurrent 
outbreaks involving 284 cases with 151 deaths (53.0% CFR) in 
Sudan, and 318 cases with 280 deaths (88.0% CFR) in DRC.6 
There have been roughly 23 other outbreaks occurring through 
to 2013, involving nearly 2,500 cases, mostly in the East and 
Central African countries of DRC, Sudan, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Uganda and Congo-Brazzaville.6,7
However, the current outbreak is characterised by a much 
larger epidemic and rapid spread, mainly among West African 
nations that are not themselves prepared for the outbreak. By 
contrast, the previous outbreak in the Ivory Coast in 1994 only 
involved a single case.7
Although the current epidemic began late in December 2013, 
it was not until March 2014 that it was fi rst reported to the 
WHO.8 Delayed identifi cation catalysed the rapid spread of the 
epidemic. Poor management of cases and ineffective outbreak 
responses, resulting from weak health systems in countries 
previously riven by civil war, with inadequate healthcare 
personnel and ineffective healthcare funding systems, further 
fuelled the epidemic, especially in the most affected countries. 
Unlike previous outbreaks of EVD, the current massive 
epidemic was further stimulated by chains of secondary spread 
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the majority of cases in hospitals or at home by HCWs who do 
not have access to proper protective equipment, African rituals 
of washing deceased bodies before burial, and the social habits 
of hand shaking and hugging.9
When the epidemic entered Nigeria, there were fears that 
the large population of Lagos, poor health systems, Nigerian 
cultures and doctors’ strikes would fuel the epidemic and make 
Nigeria a worse case than other African nations. However, 
with just 20 cases and eight deaths, Nigeria (20 October 2014) 
and Senegal (17 October 2014) were declared Ebola free by the 
WHO.10,11 The DRC may also be declared Ebola free soon, if no 
new cases are reported.2 
While the world celebrates these achievements, a number 
of issues and lessons have arisen from this ongoing epidemic: 
poor preparation of health systems for major epidemics, an 
absence of functional global surveillance systems, weak health 
systems, unprepared and unskilled HCWs, and poor access to 
and knowledge of the use of personal protective equipment. 
In addition, the devastating effects of culture, hand-washing 
habits, social media and religious practices have all been clearly 
demonstrated in the recent outbreaks. 
Since 1979 when the world agreed to pursue the ‘Health for 
All’ dream, and 2000 when the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) were accepted as global targets, there have been 
encouraging gains in the health outcomes of nations. Notably, 
Liberia has experienced impressive gains in life expectancy and 
health services.12–16
However, the gains of ‘Health for All’ and MDGs in health 
outcomes and health systems have all been reversed by the 
current prolonged and devastating EVD outbreak. The Royal 
College of Physicians (RCP) and West African College of 
Physicians (WACP) recently launched the MDG6 Partnership 
for African Clinical Training (funded by ECO Bank), towards 
the achievement of the six MDG goals of combatting HIV/
AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis (TB) and other infectious diseases. 
Initiatives such as these cannot succeed without functional and 
reliable health systems. 
The Nigerian national response 
The fi rst case of Ebola entered Nigeria through a commercial 
airline on 20 July 2014, transporting a diplomat, Patrick Sawyer, 
from Liberia to Nigeria.10 Diagnosis was suspected on 23 July 
2014 and confi rmed on 25 July 2014, the day that the patient died. 
Following this diagnosis, the Federal Ministry of Health 
(FMOH), the Nigerian Center for Disease Control (NCDC) and 
the Nigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program 
(NFELTP) were mobilised to investigate, manage and control the 
epidemic – with support from the Lagos State Government. This 
reactive and prompt response was instrumental to the tracking, 
quarantine and management of contacts in Lagos. 
In spite of this state-wide effort, the disease eventually spread 
to Port Harcourt, a city in the South of the country, via an 
individual on surveillance who came to the city to seek private 
(and secret) treatment, perhaps fearing stigmatisation. The 
doctor who treated this individual eventually contracted the 
disease and died while the patient survived, following a very 
brief illness. 
By 26 September 2014, there were 20 cases in Nigeria 
(19 confi rmed and 1 probable), with eight deaths (seven 
confi rmed and one probable) and a national CFR of 40.0% 
(Lagos, 37.5% and Port Harcourt, 50.0%). The majority of 
the affected people were HCWs (16 with 5 deaths and 31.23% 
CFR) (FMOH, 2014).
In addition to Lagos and Port Harcourt, there were 
suspected cased in Abuja, Ibadan and Ille Ife where there were 
documented episodes of ’Ebola scare’.17
The success of the national response can be linked to the 
prior establishment of the Integrated Disease Surveillance and 
Response program in 1998, the NFELTP in 2008, and NCDC in 
2012, as well as the responsiveness of the Lagos State Ministry 
of Health. Previous Nigerian experience in the management of 
Lassa Fever, another viral haemorrhagic infection, also helped 
‘nip the epidemic in the bud’. To keep the virus out of Nigeria, 
the Port Health services, which were previously ill prepared, 
responded rapidly as they started monitoring all national entry 
points (land, sea and air) and examined all who were entering 
or leaving the country through infra-red temperature checks. 
In addition, hand washing was emphasised and use of sanitisers 
publicised. 
As part of the control measures in Nigeria, there was a 
massive mobilisation, awareness creation and sensitisation of 
the populace to the dangers, signs and symptoms of EVD, and 
acceptable practices within and outside the health institutions. 
This led to a delay in school resumption and shortening of 
the duration of national camping programmes, such as the 
National Youth Service Corps. The immediate response 
by Nigeria to keep the virus at bay completely nullifi ed the 
mathematical models by averting hundreds of thousands of 
new cases. Although it was predicted that without drastic 
improvements in control measures, the numbers of cases 
of and deaths from EVD would increase from hundreds to 
thousands per week, this prediction failed to materialise.3 
A local, immediate, and culturally-sensitive response is, 
therefore, vital for timely control of epidemics. Support from 
outside is of course highly desirable, but if local capacity and 
resources are properly mobilised and channelled, external 
support may arrive when disease outbreaks are already 
contained, like in Nigeria.18 
Effect on the Nigerian health system
The Nigerian health system, though able to curtail the spread, 
was not prepared for the epidemic, despite the news of the 
disease in neighboring countries. For instance, the doctors 
were on industrial action. In addition, it took fi ve days before 
the fi rst diagnosis could be made. However, volunteer HCWs 
were available to assist in the management of the disease 
in both cities of Lagos and Port Harcourt with NFELTP 
residents deployed to the fi eld for contact tracing, monitoring 
and isolating of cases. The majority (11.55%) of those that 
contracted the disease were HCWs. To curtail the epidemic, 
funds for other health systems activities were re-routed to 
combat EVD epidemics, at the expense of other health issues. 
Isolation and quarantine centres were set up in Lagos, Port 
Harcourt and several regional centres including the University 
College Hospital, Ibadan (Fig 1). Major government hospitals 
were instructed to form an ‘Ebola Response Team’.
Daily coordination meetings were held at the Ebola 
Emergency Operations Center to document activities, review 
preparedness plans and monitor isolation centre activities. 
Supervisory visits were paid to HCWs in the fi eld. 
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‘Ebola scare’
One thing that became obvious following the extensive 
awareness campaign was a phenomenon that can be rightly 
described as ’Ebola scare, an episode that played out in Abuja, 
Ibadan and Ife-Ife, where suspected cases were encountered 
(Fig 2).17 Patients in various places presented with symptoms 
similar to that of EVD. HCWs were scared and in some cases 
became apprehensive, about becoming carriers of EVD. 
Rumours of the disease spread throughout the affected cities. 
Sometimes HCWs and would-be hospital patients were known 
to desert the hospital. The situations were reversed as soon as 
the patients tested negative to the virus, but these results could 
take 5–7 days.17
The Senegal national response
The only case of Ebola in Senegal was a student from Guinea-
Conakry who travelled to Senegal. When he was found to be 
symptomatic with diarrhoea, fever and other symptoms, he 
was seen in a suburban medical centre and was treated for 
malaria. He was then seen at the University Hospital in Dakar, 
where the diagnosis of Ebola was made on 29 August 2014, and 
he was treated.19 
At the national level, there are a number of teams activated to 
monitor for fever. All those that came in contact with the index 
case were monitored in their houses on a daily basis. In total, 
more than 67 close contacts of the initial case were identifi ed 
and monitored twice daily, fi ve contacts who developed Ebola-
like symptoms were tested and found negative.19
Six months before the case, there had been extensive 
educational activity all over Senegal and unlike Nigeria, the 
country was ready for the epidemic before the fi rst case was seen. 
The Senegal epidemic benefi ted from the presence of an Institut 
Pasteur laboratory in Dakar, a WHO-approved collaborating 
centre with excellent facilities and staff, where the initial case 
was identifi ed.19 Their extensive experience in EVD and the 
related Marburg haemorrhagic fever ensured immediate control 
and eradication of the virus from the country.
To ensure that Ebola is kept out of Senegal, the government 
has given mobile phones to the regions not far from Guinea-
Conakry with a toll-free number, which anybody could call if 
there are suspects. The government also mobilised the national 
ambulance service, which handles every emergency, to be part 
of the Ebola control process.
The Ghana national response
Ghana, like Nigeria, does not have a direct boundary with the 
three most affected nations, but unlike Nigeria, it has remained 
Ebola free due to a inter-ministerial supervisory effort of Port 
Health, immigration, security services and the Ghana Health 
Service, as well as national and regional technical coordinating 
committees and public health sensitisation efforts.
Three Ebola treatment centres were set up to manage cases. 
They were charged with surveillance, situation monitoring and 
assessment; case management; health education, social mobilisation 
and risk cmmunication; logistics, security and fi nancial resources; 
and planning and coordination. The approved insurance package 
for frontline health staff working on Ebola prevention and control 
by the government was another positive step.20 
To keep Ebola out of Ghana, the government instituted 
education and training across the health and social divide; 
created awareness in the media, churches, schools and public 
places; and encouraged prevention measures of hand washing, 
avoiding unnecessary physical contact with ill people, changing 
burial procedures and increased surveillance/screening at 
the ports. Further, the Government of Ghana facilitated the 
establishment of the United Nations’ (UN) Ebola response 
mission in Africa (United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency 
Response) to be headquartered in Ghana. 
Preparing for future outbreaks 
Current lessons learned from the ongoing outbreak should be 
institutionalised. The countries of West Africa certainly need 
to be well prepared for possible future epidemics. They need 
to learn also from their current experience, just as Nigeria was 
able to use the previous experience and structure in handling 
Lassa fever outbreaks as a model to combat the Ebola virus 
epidemic. Strong health systems with a robust public health 
component have to be put in place. Western countries like the 
USA, UK and France need to show leadership in the area of 
investigational treatment plans, while also building capacity in 
Africa generally in the area of viral haemorrhagic fevers. 
Fig 1. Prototype of an isolation and quarantine centre, University 
College Hospital, Ibadan, Nigeria.
Fig 2. Staff and relations of a hospital in Abuja, Nigeria with ‘Ebola 
scare’ in September 2014.
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The UN and WHO, as major health organisations, have to 
give direction in team building, international surveillance 
system structures and effective vaccination plans. Funding for 
research should also be made available to study survivors and 
defi ne the factors that can mitigate the spread of the disease. 
They should also show leadership by providing templates 
for the use of investigational drugs and the ethics relating to 
management of severe clinically infective cases in intensive care 
units and dialysis centres, and the use of respirators.
Robust awareness campaigns both locally and internationally 
will help to improve communication across several countries 
at risk. More importantly, countries of West Africa have to 
engage the public on a continuous basis to publicise and effect 
a preventive strategy against EVD. In addition, the RCP/WACP 
MDG6 physician applied clinical training (M-PACT) project 
will further improve capacity and leadership to manage current 
and future epidemics and outbreaks in the subregion.
Conclusion
Although the outbreak is still ongoing in Liberia, Guinea 
and Sierra Leone, there are indications that the epidemic is 
subsiding.2 Lessons learnt from Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana can 
be fed into the control process to further reduce the devastation 
of this epidemic. The excellent role of local skilled manpower, as 
seen in Nigeria, calls for a more effective development of human 
resources for future outbreaks. The role of institutions such as 
the NFELTP, NCDC and Lagos State Government shows the 
relevance of focused institutions in the management of health 
hazards. Continued support of the most affected nations by the 
USA, UK and France will prevent similar outbreaks by funding 
the establishment of national fi eld epidemiology and laboratory 
training programmes in these nations. The current partnership 
between RCP and WACP is a step in the right direction. When 
the proposed centres are up and running, they will help build 
capable HCWs who, among several other things, will be useful 
in the prevention and control of outbreaks such as EVD. 
Finally, the gains of the outbreak, such as improved Port 
Health services, public health activities in Nigeria, hand-
washing practices and burial practices should be strengthened 
and institutionalised. 
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